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was "wilful or unprovoked physical aggression." Idaho Code §
previously, holding that it means employees

This

may file claims in court only when an employer or its agents "physically and offensively or hostilely
attacked the employee" with "an intention to injure the employee." Kearney v. Denker, 114 Idaho
755, 757-58 (1988); see also DeAfoss v. City ofCoeur d'Alene, 118 Idaho 176 (1990). Idaho's

1s

also consistent with the vast majority of other states, which have adopted the same rule.
Plaintiffs now try to persuade this Court to disregard the plain language of the statute, discard
decades-long, settled Idaho precedent, and depart from the majority rule in the United

1

arc

m

a

court

to injure them.

argue

is why they try to reinterpret

and
Rule. The Court should decline

Plaintiffs' request. The worker's compensation law is clear as to the conduct required before an
employee can bring a lawsuit for workplace injuries, and this Court's precedent interpreting the statute
is equally clear.

It likely has not escaped the Court's notice that this appeal is the second appeal now pending
before the Court brought by Hecla employees injured on the job and seeking to enlarge the exception
to

Exclusivity Rule. This does not

employees are frequently injured,

2

rather

m

costs

to

no

lS

cannot

11,

complaint on

provides that

Vol. 1, pp. 1
On May 29, 2015, after discovery,

12, 2014.

sole recourse is

compensation

(R.

1,

pp. 146-168) On June 15, 2015, Plaintiffs cross-moved for partial slUllillary judgment, seeking a
ruling that the Exclusivity Rule does not apply to their claims. (R. Vol. 3-4, pp. 728-772)
On August 28, 2015, the district court entered an order granting Defendants' motion for
summary judgment and denying Plaintiffs' cross-motion. (R. Vol. 5, pp. 1148-1160) Relying on this
Court's decisions in Kearney v. Denker, 114 Idaho 755 (1988) and DeMoss v. City ofCoeur d'Alene,
118 Idaho 176 (1990), the district court rejected Plaintiffs' argument that the exception to the

3

5,

any

to
to cause

1

on

it
basis to affirm

15.

p. 11

1

15.

are more

nr,c,c,c,n"tc

district court's judgment.

to Plaintiffs'

misrepresentation of

1.

The Uncontested Facts

Hecla owns and operates the Lucky Friday Mine, which is one of the deepest underground
in the United States, located in Idaho's Silver Valley. (R.

1, p. 21

Although it is called the Lucky Friday Mine, Hecla has not mined the Lucky Friday vein-that is, the
thin vertical ribbon of valuable ore embedded in the rock after which the
than a decade. (R. Vol. 3, p. 618) Rather, for the

years, the Lucky

4

Mine

been

two

to

to

to

at
1

L'

a

went
and had a

center that was large enough that vehicles could pass through as

the mine shaft, a mile
(Bayer Deel.)) This was called

through to the far

went

of the Gold Hunter vein. (R. Vol. 1, p. 170

5900 pillar. (Id)

The 5900 pillar was planned and maintained by Hecla \vith expert help. During the planning
of the pillar in 2004, Hecla retained consulting engineers to model the mining that would occur, so as

1

Doug Bayer was, in December 2011, the Superintendent of the Lucky Friday Mine. (R. Vol. 1,
p. 169 (Bayer Deel.)) Prior to that, he was the mine's Foreman and Chief Engineer. (Id.) He has
a Bachelor of Science degree in mining engineering and, as of 2011, had 25 years'
m
mining. (Id. at 170)

5

to

)
)
1, p.
61 ))

1,

(Id. at 172)

also retained Dr.
1

to

in the development

Rehabilitation Plan. (R. Vol. 1, p.

(Blake

2

Dr. Blake has a Ph.D. in mining engineering, and had, as of 2011, 45 years' experience in mining
engineering. (R. Vol. 1, p. 143 (Blake Aff.))

3

Dr. Board has a Ph.D. in geological engineering, and 40 years of experience in underground
mines. (R. Vol. 5, p. 997 (Board Deel.))
4

A rock burst is "a sudden and violent failure of overstressed rock resulting in the instantaneous
release oflarge amounts of accumulated
" 30 C.F.R. § 57.2.

6

1
filling

p.

was

wall. (R.

1, p.

noticed some popping
(Blake Dep.

13:1

1

During

first

cracking sounds and minor dribbling from the rock walls. (R. Vol. 1, pp.
18-85:9); R. Vol. 4, p. 827 (Williams Aff.))

sounds are a normal

occurrence at the mine, and do not typically foreshadow an upcoming event. (R. Vol. 1, p. 203 (Blake
Dep. 80: 11-81: 7) )5 Further, the reason the Rehabilitation Plan was being implemented was to address

5

Dr. Blake testified further that such noises and dribbling are "very typical in deep underground
mines," and "a normal consequence of advancing an opening in stressed ground," which is what
the miners were doing in
first phase of the Rehabilitation Plan. (R. Vol. 1, p. 203 (Blake Dep.
80:13-14
81:2-3)) Dr. Blake testified that such phenomena are not unexpected: "It's when it

7

to

that and it's kind
indication that it's time to get

that this used to
old
(R. Vol. I, p. 203 (Blake Dep. 81:4-7))

6

an

The original plan called for Hecla to install six new stress gauges. (R. Vol. 1, p. 240 (Bayer Dep.
54: 13-16)) Hecla had only three in its possession, which it installed, and then it ordered three
more. (Id. (55:4-6)) Plaintiffs assert that "Hecla never installed the three remaining gauges" (App.
Brief p. 10), but they ignore the evidence they elicited that Hecla ultimately realized that the
gauges were installed between the wall and the tunnel liner, they would not be accessible in the
future. (R. Vol. 1, p. 241 (Bayer Dep. 59:20-22)) As a result, Hecla changed the plan, and notified
MSHA that it would install the three additional gauges just outside the tunnel liner once the liner
was installed. (Id. (59: l 19)) So, the three final gauges were not installed, but only because the
installation of the
liner was not completed. (Id. (59:24-60: l) ("So it didn't matter if
were there that day or not. I had to get the tunnel liner in first and then get the gauges in."))

8

oversaw

area

at
installing

tunnel li..'1er. (Jd.) He observed no

in the

that had been applied

phase of the Rehabilitation Plan or any other changes to the walls or ceilii1-g of the 5900 pillaror anything that would suggest

(Jd)

pillar was

However, at 7:40 pm on December 14, 2011, a rock burst occurred in the 5900 pillar. (R. Vol.
1, p. 23 (Compl.

,r 26))

Plaintiffs suffered injuries in the rock burst. (Jd.) In addition to Plaintiffs, a

member of Heda's management team, Geoff Parker, was in the 5900 pillar and was injured. (Sup.
R., p. 7 (Amended Bayer Deel.)) Because Hecla had stopped mining activities nearly 24 hours earlier,
it is clear that mining activities did not cause the rock burst. (R. Vol. 5, p. 1003 (Board Deel.) ("The
blasting associated

the rnining cycle behveen

9

to

not

time to
on

a

not

to

First, Plaintiffs assert that

Friday Mine was particularly susceptible to

given its high quartzite rock properties," citing the deposition testimony of Heda's consultant,
(App.

Gold

p. 2)

Hunter vein, not the Lucky Friday vein, which is located one mile away. (See supra at 5) As Dr.
Blake testified at the very pages Plaintiffs cite, "the Gold Hunter is much more-less burst-much
burst prone than the actual Lucky Friday Mine." (R. Vol. 1,

7

191 (Blake Dep. 30:9-11))

Plaintiffs argue that the rock burst was caused by mining activities (App. Brief pp. 12-13), but
the only evidence they cite in support of this assertion is R. 488, which says nothing of the sort.
(App.
Brief -p. 13)
- -

10

a

Thus, as
to

1,

concern as

to

]'

not.
a

not
1.

Vol. 1, p. 32 (Compl. ,
a rock burst, as Dr. Board, a

burst

a

A

failure is different

in geological engineering, swore under oath. (R. Vol. 5, p. 999

(Board Deel.) ("There is a distinction between a pillar failure and a rockburst.
This is not a technical distinction: Whereas pillar failures can sometimes be predicted in
advance, "[a] rockburst is an unpredictable event of rock failure associated with either movement on
pre-existing discontinuities within the rock mass or from localized failure of brittle, intact, rock." (R.
Vol. 5, p. 999 (Board Deel.)) Thus, the stress gauges that feature prominently in Plaintiffs' brief are
irrelevant to the rock burst that actually caused Plaintiffs' injuries, because gauges "cannot be used to

11

not even support
never was a
stress

see
Board reviewed the stress measurements and concluded that
readings that were

do not

of the 5900 drift pillar and certainly are not predictive of the rockburst of December 14, 2011." (R.
Vol. 5, p. 1000 (Board Deel.)) Plaintiffs put the stress measurements before the Court, hoping the

8

To be clear, the stress gauges did not show signs of a coming pillar failure either. Dr. Board
offered a sworn statement that, contrary to Plaintiffs' contention, the readings from the stress
gauges in the 5900 pillar "do not show an increase in stress that would be predictive of the failure
of the 5900 drift pillar." (R. Vol. 5, p. 1000 (Board Deel.))

12

or

near

to

Vol.

506

was not a current risk, given the
did not
become an actual problem.)

did not

Regardless, however one interprets Dr. Blake's statement about

9

Although Plaintiffs note that the stress readings showed "an increase in 1000 psi in just two
weeks (App. Brief pp. 9, 32), they neglect to explain the baseline stress levels on the pillar, so that
the Court has context to understand the seemingly large increase. With good reason: When put in
context, 1,000 psi is not a large increase. Rather, the record indicates that the baseline stress levels
on the pillar were "about 12 to 16,000 psi and about 9 - 11,000 psi." (R. Vol. 5, p. 1028) Thus, a
1,000 increase in psi represents only a 6% to 11 % increase.

13

m

to

on

statement:

was

Q.

Okay. So you saw updates "''"'"._,.._,LL,,,F,
monitoring

saw

stress levels as

A.

Q.

And you did that daily?

A.

Yes.

(R. Vol. 1, p. 258 (Bayer Dep. 128:6-15)) 10 And as to the consultant, Plaintiffs concede that he
received "four to five days of monitoring gauge readings." (App. Brief p. 9) Given that the daily

10

Plaintiffs emphasize that Bayer testified that he is not a specialist in rock mechanics. (App.
Brief pp. 4, 33-34) Plaintiffs omit that Bayer also testified that, although he is not a specialist, he
has substantial experience with rock mechanics. (R. Vol. 1, p. 230 (Bayer Dep. 14:14-18) ("[A]t

14

3

statement to

it

not.

stress
mcrease
not

to occur for

statements were

significantly reduced"

now

a1nount

to

2,

303),

that "the occurrence of

large

in this

pillar is unlikely." (Id. at 304) Further, Hecla provided the stress measurements themselves to MSHA,
Vol. 1, p. 252 (Bayer Dep. 104:3-5))

so that MSHA could draw its own conclusions.

Lucky Friday my first job as a -- my title was a senior mine engineer. And one of my
responsibilities was doing some of the rock mechanics. So I have a fair amount of experience at
the mine with rock mechanics."); R. Vol. 1, p. 170 (Bayer Deel.) ("I also worked with the Bureau
of Mines on studies they were doing in rock mechanics.")) Additionally, Bayer has a college
degree in mining engineering, and formerly served as the mine's Chief Engineer and Foreman.
(R. Vol. 1, pp. 169-70 (Bayer Deel.)) The allegation that Bayer is not qualified to offer his own
views on risks in the mine is nonsense.

15

that gauge was not

accurately, but I believe that the

1,

stress." (R. Vol.

the uniform evidence establishes that Defendants thought (and

7 (Blake Dep. 135:6-8))
stress

was providing accurate readings of the rock at

point

where it was inserted. To be clear, the stress levels at that single point were not representative of the
wall in general. But Defendants knew that, which is why they installed and monitored multiple
gauges, and why they discounted the readings from the third gauge. (R. Vol. 1, p. 217 (Blake Dep.
135:4) ("I discounted the gauge.")) This is not evidence of malfeasance; it is evidence that Defendants
were being careful, with multiple redundancies and a sophisticated understanding of the technology
and the mine.

16

on mmmg

is borderline

that it

\:\'aS

is not:

IS

means it must
access

sentence. Thus,

of the drafts

the

the sentence they

was removed was actually added. 11
But,

both versions of the

support

Rehabilitation Plan. Both opine that

the Rehabilitation Plan would address the risk present in the 5900 pillar. Specifically, both reports
say:
The ground support installed during the rehabilitation of the 5900 pillar will contain
the damage from any further small bursts that might be induced by continuing
closure. Installing some type of tunnel sets through this pillar, and isolating them
11

To be clear, in responding to Plaintiffs' suggestive, leading questions at his deposition, Dr. Blake
appeared to make the same mistake as Plaintiffs. (R. Vol. 1, p. 214 (Blake Dep. 123:4-9))

17

of

never

no

statement is

in the
that

permission for "normal

on
Order)) Second,

activities."

Plaintiffs assert that "MSHA was never informed of the full nature of the u~,~"''M activities during this
time." (App. Brief p. 12) No evidence supports this assertion either. Rather, Doug Bayer testified
that he told MSHA that Hecla requested to "resume mining operations and production." (R. Vol. 1,
p. 253 (Bayer Dep. 108:24-25)) No record evidence contradicts him, and in fact Bayer's statement is
consistent with MSHA's December 6 approval order.
*

*

*

A fundamental problem vvith Plaintiffs' presentation is that they pretend as though Defendants
said, and Plaintiffs believed, that the 5900 pillar was a risk-free area. That proposition is ludicrous.

18

a

new

on
a risk that cannot

lS

of event for which the worker's compensation

was created.

OF
"In an appeal from an order of summary judgment, this Court's standard of review is the same

as the standard used by the trial court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Estate ofBecker
v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522,525 (2004). In the trial court, "[s]ummary judgment is appropriate if the

pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter

19

a

court
a physical

an

order to

to

Exclusivity Rule, and correctly held further

the exception to

Plaintiffs had not submitted any evidence

suggesting Defendants committed a physical

A.

Plaintiffs Must Show They Were Injured By A Wilful, Physical Attack In
Order To Satisfy The Exception To The Exclusivity Rule.
1.

This Court's Decisions In Kearney And DeMoss Set Forth The
Exclusivity Rule.
Exception
For
Governing

This Court has twice addressed the scope of the exception to the Exclusivity Rule. In each
decision, the Court held that "wilful or unprovoked physical aggression" means a physical attack
intended to injure.

Kearney v. Denker, 114 Idaho 755 (1988),

20

reviewed a case

an

to

someone.

recourse v,.:as
as an

statute
hostile attack.

Kearney, 114 Idaho at

Thus, to invoke the exception, an

must

have "evidence of some offensive action or hostile attack." Id. The Court held further that "[i]t is not
sufficient to prove that the alleged

committed

even if those acts "made it

substantially certain that injury would occur." Id. (emphasis added). A,_pplying this principle, the
Court explained that "[t]here was no evidence presented to the trial court in this case that the employer
wilfully or without provocation physically and offensively or hostilely attacked the employee.

Id.

Consequently, "the trial court was justified in granting summary judgment against the employee." Id.
at 758. Eliminating any uncertainty, the Court summed up, explaining that the exception to the

21

to

V.

d

to cut

the

a

a

so, a
12

no
to work
working

insulation. Id. Only

dangerous asbestos. Id. In their lawsuit,

did the employees find out they had
argued that the defendants "knew the
'lied' to the

appellants by not telling them it was asbestos; and that the defendants failed to provide adequate

Plaintiffs' description of DeMoss conveniently ignores this lie by the employer, which is
significant given Plaintiffs' accusations that Defendants lied to them and to MSHA. (App. Brief
pp. 21-22) Here, Defendants deny Plaintiffs' allegations (and submit that the record supports
them), but the point is that, even if Plaintiffs are correct, their claim would still be foreclosed by
DeMoss, which found such lies insufficient
12

to

no

or
were
to

or

§

and thus the plaintiffs' state tort

claims were preempted by the \Vorker's Compensation

" Id. And the Court further held: "To

unprovoked physical aggression' as required

'""''t"'r"'t"

what we said in Kearney v. Denker, 'It is not sufficient to prove that the alleged aggressor

committed negligent acts that made it substantially certain that injury would occur."' Id. It affirmed
summary judgment for the defendants. Id.
Thus, this Court has been clear, and the question has been settled for more than 25 years, that
a physical attack with intent to injure is required before an employee may bring a lawsuit for a
workplace injury.

23

a consc10us
to

9

to the
to an intentional

must be a "deliberate infliction of

jab to the

For instance, in Van Biene v. ERA Helicopters, Inc., 779 P.2d 315 (Alaska 1989), the Alaska
airline

Court

13

Larson's has been cited repeatedly by this Court as authoritative on worker's compensation
issues. See, e.g., Kelly v. Blue Ribbon Linen Supply, Inc., 159 Idaho 324, 338 (2015); Corgatelli
v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287, 293 (2014); Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint Sch. Dist. #401, 147
285-86 (2009). Larson's has also been held out as authoritative by other state supreme
Idaho
cmuts. See, e.g., Helf v. Chevron US.A., Inc., 361 P.3d 63, 82 (Utah 2015) (describing Larson's
as a "leading commentator"); State Farm A1utual Auto. Ins. v. Wilson, 199 P.3d 581, 590 (Alaska
2008) (referring to Larson's as "a leading text"); Kawakami v. City and County of Honolulu, 59
P.3d 920, 924 (Haw. 2002) (referring to Larson's as "the leading treatise on worker's
compensation"); Brittingham v. St. Michael's Rectory, 788 A.2d 519, 523 (Del. 2002) (referring
to Larson's as "the leading authoritative treatise on the subject'').

24

to
tort

at 317.

to

to

at

8.
not
V.

""'".,.""mp,

Court heard an

~·c,b"'b

UIJ!-lvU.l

collapsed.

,,F,,.,_,...,,_., a11d "issued four

was killed when a

claim by the
the collapse, the Occupational Health

Safety

including

citations"

"failing to provide

a ladder to escape the trench; for failure to have a competent person conduct daily inspection of trench;
and for not taking adequate safety precautions for a trench over five feet deep." Id. at 16 & n.4. The
case was tried to a jury, which detennined that the employer had caused the employee's death through
"deliberate intention." Id. at 14.
Despite the jury's verdict, the court held that the evidence did not satisfy the exception to the
Exclusivity Rule.

The court explained that, to satisfy the exception, "the employer must have

25

7.

to

to

9.
l

to
to

a safe
of equipment" Id. at 160.
exception to

court

Rule. It first explained that "there is a split of authority as to how to judge an employer's conduct and
two rules have emerged: the intentional tort doctrine followed by the majority of states and the
substantial certainty doctrine that is followed by only a few states." 14 Rafferty, 760

14

at 159-60.

The substantial certainty rule was endorsed by Justice Huntley, who concurred in Kearney. See
Kearney, 114 Idaho at 758 (Huntley, J., concurring). That position was rejected by the majority.

26

court

were

or

had been
auger, such that people coming near it could easily slip
employer's actions were

gram

ground around

fall into it. Id.

employee alleged that

and state statutes and regulations,"

direct violation

the employer "could have easily been corrected by installation of a protective covering over the
opening." Id. Finally, the plaintiff alleged that "the employer was aware that this condition was
hazardous and dangerous to its employees and recognized the substantial certainty that it would result

Id. at 757 ("It is not sufficient to prove that the alleged aggressor committed negligent acts that
made it substantially certain that injury would occur.").

27

to

to

act

or
aware.

warn

15

are
states
1s m
accord with this Court's decisions in Kearney
Stat.
§
1022 (exclusivity rule applies unless the employee was
to
act done knowingly
and purposely with the direct object of injuring another."); Torres v. Parkhouse Tire Service, Inc.,
30 P.3d 57, 60 (Cal. 2001) (holding that "intended injurious conduct" is required to satisfy the
exception to the exclusivity rule); Schwindt v. Hershey Foods Corp., 81 P.3d 1144, 1147 (Colo.
App. 2003) ("We agree with the analysis in the Larson's treatise and decline to adopt the
'substantial certainty' approach taken by a minority of the courts."); Copass v. Illinois Power Co.,
569 N.E.2d 1211, 1215 (Ill. Ct. App. 1991) ("we hold that plaintiff is required to allege defendants
had the specific intent to injure."); Baker v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 637 N.E.2d 1271, 1275
(Ind. 1994) ("nothing short of deliberate intent to inflict an injury, or actual knowledge that an
injury is certain to occur, will suffice"); Johnson v. Mountaire Farms, 503 A.2d 708, 711-12 (Md.
Ct. App. 1986) (to satisfy the exception to the Exclusivity Rule requires "an intentional or
deliberate act by the employer with a desire to bring about the consequences of the act"); Mich.
Comp. Laws § 418.131 (exception to the exclusivity rule satisfied only when "the employer
specifically intended an injury"); Gunderson v. Harrington, 632 N.W.2d 695, 703 (Minn. 2001)
(the employee must identify evidence the employer "consciously and deliberately intended to
injure" in order to satisfy the exception to the Exclusivity Rule); Bowden v. Young, 120 So.3d 971,
982 (Miss. 2013) ("the plaintiff must show actual intent to injure the employee"); Light v. JC
Indus., 926 S.W.2d 25, 27 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (worker's compensation is the exclusive remedy

28

an

''

at

a.

the term

not

1

to

6)

long as the employer does not intentionally injure
employee"); Harris v. State, 294 P.3d
382,386 (Mont. 2013) (an employee must show "an intentional and deliberate act specifically and
actually intended to cause injUiry"); Conway v. Circus Casinos, Inc., 8 P.3d 837, 840 (Nev. 2000)
(requiring that the employer "deliberately and specifically intended to injure them"); Pereira v. St.
Joseph's Cemetery, 54 AD.3d 835, 836-37 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) ("the conduct must be engaged
in with the desire to bring about the consequences of the act; a mere knowledge and appreciation
of a risk is not the same as the intent to cause injury"); N.D. Cent. Code§ 65-01-01.1 (employer's
action must be taken "'with the conscious purpose of inflicting the injury"); Kaminski v. 1t1etal &
Wire Prods., 927 N.E.2d 1066, 1079 (Ohio 2010) ("the only way an employee can recover is if the
employer acted with intent to cause injury"); Peay v. US. Silica Co., 437 S.E.2d 64 (S.C. 1993)
(enforcing intentional tort doctrine, and refusing to adopt substantial certainty doctrine); Valencia
v. Freeland & Lemm Constr. Co., 108 S.W.3d 239, 243 (Tenn. 2003) (requiring "actual intent to
injure"); Vallandigham v. Clover Park Sch. Dist. No. 400, 109 P.3d 805,810 (Wash. 2005) ("Even
failure to observe safety laws or procedures does not constitute specific intent to injure, nor does
an act that had only substantial certainty of producing injury.").
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it means is not
at
V.

is not

not
inasmuch as '"wilful' connotes deliberation or

determined and stubborn

" (R. Vol. 3, p. 531 (emphasis added)) Thus, 1'v1r. Smith did not argue that "wilful" means
a standard lower

he argued that

required for an act to be willful. Thus, the supposed legislative history submitted by Plaintiffs
supports Defendants' position, not Plaintiffs'.
Plaintiffs also argue that the fact that the Legislature has an1ended various parts of the worker's
compensation law since adding the exception to the Exclusivity Rule in 1972 supports their argument
that the Legislature

with Plaintiffs' interpretation of the statute. (App. Brief p. 17) To the

contrary, this Court issued Kearney in 1988, and stated clearly at that tinle that the statute "require[s]
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to

intent.

m

we

m
was intended to mean "something more
(App. Brief p. 16) Plaintiffs support this conclusion

less than

to

decisions explaining that the
the phrase "vvillful and wanton"

does not appear in the worker's compensation law; rather, the term "wilful" does, by itself. As this
Court has previously explained when the Legislature used the same term in different places, if the
Legislature intended different meanings, it would have used different terms. See, e.g., Robison v.

Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 211 (2003) ("Fundamentally, if the legislature had intended LC.

§ 72-223 to provide broader immunity, then it could have used language different from that used in
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course,
V.

'1

'it
were
explanation in

a result,
Blaine

17-18) that the term

School District, 15 8 Idaho 24 2 (2015) (discussed at App.
wanton" includes recklessness is not

it

not

Plaintiffs here. The

same is true of Jacobsen v. City of Rathdrum, 115 Idaho 266 (1988) (discussed at App. Brief p. 18),
which also discussed the term "wilful or wanton." Id. at 270-71.
If the Court were to look to prior precedent interpreting other uses of the terms that appear in
the worker's compensation law, it should look to instances where the term "wilful" appears alone,
without "wanton." This happens often, and this Court has interpreted '\:vilful" to mean an intentional
act. Thus, the ,:vilful desertion of a ,uu,u""'f'," requires "intent to desert." Idaho Code § 32-606; see
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even

151,
1

as

on
20

and

is true that LC. §

speaks volumes. As

does not use the phrase 'intentional act,' but it does use the phrase 'willful physical aggression.'
is hard to put [sic] to explain how an act

willful physical aggression is not an intentional act."

(R. Vol. 5, p. 1158) 16

Once the district court held, based on Kearney and DeAfoss, that intent to injure was required, it
looked to (among other things) three non-Idaho decisions that supported its conclusion that
Plaintiffs have not established a genuine dispute whether Defendants acted with intent to injure
thern. (R. Vol. 5, pp. 1156-58) Plaintiffs criticize this reliance, arguing that the decisions do not
establish that the exception to the Exclusivity Rule requires intent to injure. (App. Brief pp. 2728) But that is not why the district court relied on thern. Rather, it relied on thern in assessing
whether Plaintiffs had rnet their burden after it had already decided that their burden was to
16
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set out

to
to

or
at 11.

to

it was "inconsistent

to continue to claim

of an intentional

was

tort." Id. However, the Court disagreed, holding that "an employee is not required to forgo the filing
a worker's compensation claim in order to sue his employer

or

physical

aggression." Id. at 12.
Thus, Dominguez did not address the question already answered by Kearney and De111oss
regarding the scope of the exception to the Exclusivity Rule. Indeed, contrary to Plaintiffs' description
of the decision, Dominguez explicitly refused to review the merits of the plaintiff's claim. As the

establish an intention to injure. The district court's decision that Plaintiffs have no facts suggesting
an intention to injure was plainly correct See infra, Part III.B.
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17

it

as true because

defaulted-that

steel

employer

tank, but concealed that fact from Dominguez." Id. After entering the

17

Mr.

Plaintiffs argue that Dominguez must have spoken to whether the plaintiffs allegations satisfied
the exception to the Exclusivity Rule, because, even in the event of a default judgment, the factual
allegations "still had to form the basis for a valid claim for relief." (App. Brief p. 24) But in
making this argument, Plaintiffs simply ignore what this Court said-namely, that it would not
review the merits of the case. Plaintiffs cannot credibly argue that this Court reached a conclusion
it did not actually reach. Plaintiffs' reliance on In re Elias, 302 B.R. 900 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2003)
is even further afield. That decision, from a federal bankruptcy court, involved the same litigants
as Dominguez and addressed the question whether the judgment of the district court in Dominguez
was dischargeable in the employer's bankruptcy proceeding. Id. at 902. In analyzing that question,
the court held that the judgment in Dominguez had a preclusive effect on the issue of whether the
defendants acted with "an extremely harmful state of mind." Id. at 912. It said nothing about this
Court's decision in Dominguez, which had not even been issued yet.
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treatment

was imminent.
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Rule,
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Kearney

c.,~,+,+lfr

to

still could not satisfy

DeMoss Were Correctly Decided.

In addition to being the settled law of this State and representative of the majority

across

the United States, Kearney and DeMoss were rightly decided. The minority view-the substantial
certainty test-would not be faithful to the language ofldaho's worker's compensation law, and also
would disturb the balance between employees and employers that is inherent in the worker's
compensation system.
First, Kearney and De}vfoss were rightly decided because they were true to the statutory
language in the worker's compensation law. The exception to the Exclusivity Rule provides that
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not

connotes an

test

is not the only reason: Another purpose

return to

protect industry by providing a limit on liability." Id., see also 9 Larson s Workers'
Compensation Law§ 103.03 (explaining that one of the

Rule is

"to minimize litigation, even litigation of undoubted merit").
Adopting the substantial certainty test would undo the limits on employer liabilityincluding, significantly, the limits on litigation expenses. As a practical matter, in almost any tort
case, a plaintiff can allege negligence, gross negligence, or recklessness. The difference between
them is not easily resolved without trial. As a result, if recklessness could satisfy the exception to the
Exclusivity Rule, Lhe number of lawsuits against employers could rise dramatically, as would the
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Kearney, even if Defendants' actions made it substantially certain that injury would occur

implementing the Rehabilitation Plan-which, to be clear, there is no evidence
be enough. And, as

\Ji

"'"L• would not

DeJ\,foss, even if Defendants knew the 5900 pillar was unsafe-which, again,

there is no evidence of-that is not enough. Rather, this Court has been clear: The exception to the
Exclusivity Rule applies only when an employer or its agents physically attack an employee with
intent to injure him. Kearney, 114 Idaho at 757 (a defendant must "wilfully or without provocation
physically and offensively or hostilely attacked the employee"). There is no evidence of that here,
and not even any allegation of it. Plaintiffs have presented no evidence that Defendants physically
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were aware

2-13,

stress

concluded that the
at

18

3,

Plaintiffs'

do offer the affidavits of two experts, who opine that Defendants' conduct was
"willful" and with "deliberate intent." (App. Brief pp. 35-38) Such "expert" opinions are plainly
inadmissible, even on a motion for summary judgment. As this Court explained in Athay v. Stacey,
142 Idaho 360 (2005), an expert's opinions regarding mental state are inadmissible. Specifically,
in Athay the Court considered an expert's opinion that the defendants' conduct constituted
"reckless disregard." Id. at 366. The Court held the opinion inadmissible for two reasons: First,
"there is no indication that the expert knew the standard in Idaho for reckless disregard." Id. at
367. Rather, "[w]ithout defining what he understood the standard to be, he simply stated several
times throughout his affidavits that the [defendants'] conduct constituted reckless disregard." Id.
Second, "reckless disregard includes the element that the [defendant] actually perceived the high
degree of manifest danger and continued his course of conduct." Id. "The [plaintiffs'] expert is
no more qualified than the average juror to draw conclusions from the evidence regarding what
any of the Defendants actually perceived or understood." Id. at 368. Here, Plaintiffs' experts'
opinions are foreclosed by both of Athay's reasons. First, Plaintiffs' experts opined on the relevant
legal standard without any indication they understand what the standard means. Second, Plaintiffs'
experts are no more qualified to draw conclusions from the evidence about intent than a jury would
be. As a result, Plaintiffs' experts' affidavits cannot be considered.
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or

attack against

Similarly, in DeMoss, the employer

It made no

employee. Kearney, 114 Idaho at
sent employees to work \vith what it knew might be
suspicion that it was asbestos. See supra at

to investigate an

22-23. Then, after the employer received confirmation of asbestos, it again sent the employees to
work with the material-this time knowing it was asbestos, lying to the employees by telling them it
was something harmless, and providing the employees with minimal safety clothing (paper coveralls
and masks). Id. Again, although the employer was alleged to have sent employees into a known risky
situation, and even lied about it, the Court held that the exception to the Exclusivity Rule was not
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statements.
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risk

not

statute.

on statements by
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was

JS

p.
on
that the

it

assessment
to address that

was the very Rehabilitation

that

,~~,··~·~ were implementing when they were injured. When considered in context, it is clear that
advice that it should proceed

Hecla

2.

the Rehabilitation Plan.

Conducting Mining Activities Is Not A Physical Attack \Vith Intent
To Injure.

As explained above, the evidence demonstrates that Heda's mining activities between the first
and second phases of the Rehabilitation Plan did not cause the December 14 rock burst. See supra at
11. But, even if they did, that would not satisfy the exception to the Exclusivity Rule because even
Plaintiffs do not allege that Hecla engaged in mining activities intending to injure them. At best for
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m

That is

to Plaintiffs
7-12)
IS

support in the record

assertion.

at

6. But even if

are

correct, the allegations would not satisfy the exception to the Exclusivity Rule.
First, lying to MSHA is wholly irrelevant. In no way could that constitute an offensive or
hostile physical attack on Plaintiffs. This is true primarily because lying to MSHA does not involve
Plaintiffs. But it is also true because it is not a physical action, and it is not an attack.
Second, lying to Plaintiffs themselves would not satisfy the statute either, because it would
not constitute a physical attack. For instarice, in De1\4oss, the employer eventually tested the substance
insulating the boiler and determined that it was indeed asbestos. See supra at 22-23. After it received
the results indicating that the substarice was asbestos, a supervisor still told the employees that the
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Ramsden, Of the Finn
Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents
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